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abstract 
In this paper we report the results of two experiments examining the influence of sunk historical 
investments for internal production on the outsourcing decision.  Outsourcing activities to external 
2 
companies is an important issue in today's competitive environment.  Transaction cost economics offers 
a theoretical explanation taking into account future transaction and production costs.  In this theoretical 
framework, asset specificity and uncertainty are the main explanatory variables for the choice between 
producing internally or outsourcing to suppliers.  We study the additional influence of internal sunk 
costs on outsourcing.  We conclude that, contrary to accounting norms and standard economic theory, 
sunk costs are an additional explanatory factor in the outsourcing decision. 
keywords: outsourcing; sunk cost; transaction costs; managerial decision making 3 
1. Introduction 
A company is a value chain or a sequence of business functions in which utility is 
added to the output of the organization.  Effectiveness and efficiency in the different 
parts of the value chain are necessary conditions for the realization of firms' 
objectives.  Shank and Govindarajan (1992) note that "once the value chain is fully 
articulated, critical decisions regarding make/buy and forwardlbackward integration 
become clearer".  The outsourcing of activities to suppliers or the reduction of its own 
activities in the value chain offers a potential to realize important cost savings. 
Value chain and activity analysis enable a company to concentrate on its most 
efficient activities with a comparative advantage over competitors and to outsource 
other activities to external vendors.  In the accounting practitioners' literature, Drtina 
(1994) discusses some successful outsourcing decisions and studies the different steps 
in the outsourcing decision process.  He concentrates on production cost differences 
between in house production and external procurement but also considers the potential 
problem of transaction costs.  He indeed argues that one of the greatest potential costs 
is the damage incurred by a firm that becomes overly dependent on its outsourcing 
partners.  Similarly, Chalos (1995) concludes that firms do not always realize the 
benefits they expected from outsourcing because they underestimate transaction and 
coordination costs.  Outsourcing is only desirable if external scope economies exist 
and contracts are strictly enforceable.  With respect to information technology 
sourcing, it was found empirically that companies which engage in total outsourcing experienced problems a few years into their contracts due to transaction costs (Lacity, 
Willcocks and Feeny, 1996). 
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From a theoretical point of view, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1989) 
allows us to focus on the economic reasons for outsourcing.  In this framework a 
transaction is the basic unit of analysis.  A transaction occurs when a good or service 
is transferred across a technologically separable interface.  Asset specificity and 
uncertainty are major explanatory variables for outsourcing decisions.  They influence 
future differences in governance and production costs that determine the choice 
between own production and market procurement.  Management accountants 
traditionally play an important role in this decision because it requires an accurate 
analysis of future governance and production cost differences that are associated with 
these options. 
Only relevant revenues and costs should be taken into account.  These can be defined 
as expected future revenues and costs that differ between the different alternative 
decision possibilities.  Sunk costs are past costs that are unavoidable because they 
cannot be changed no matter what action is taken and are irrelevant in the decision 
process (Horngren, Foster and Datar, 1994).  But, contrary to what accounting 
textbooks prescribe, decision makers sometimes take sunk costs into account in the 
decision process (Ghosh, 1995). 
In this paper we experimentally test the existence of this 'sunk cost effect' in the 
outsourcing decision.  Section 2 introduces the transaction cost economics approach to 5 
outsourcing where asset specificity and uncertainty determine a firm's efficient 
boundaries.  The third section deals with the sunk cost effect and describes its 
potential effect on the outsourcing decision.  Section four introduces our empirical 
studies and discusses the main results.  The last section concludes the paper and gives 
directions for future research. 
2. Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1989) considers transaction and production 
costs differences for alternative governance structures.  Efficient firms should adopt 
the organizational mode that best economizes on the sum of these costs.  Transactions 
should occur in the market when this is more efficient than internal production 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1986; Lieberman, 1991; Lyons, 1995).  In many circumstances 
a shift to market procurement requires vertical de-integration of the firm. 
According to transaction cost economics uncertainty and the degree of asset 
specificity are the most important considerations in the outsourcing decision.  Specific 
assets are specialized to the exchange between buyer and seller rather than being 
usable for other purposes without losing value.  For example, if outsourcing of part of 
the production process requires the manufacturer to invest in dedicated transportation 
equipment, this investment is asset specific if it can not be used for other purposes. 
Asset specificity is symmetrical (Williamson, 1981) such that both parties are locked 
into mutual transactions to an important degree.  It may result from investment in 
specific human capital, site specific capital, specific physical capital, dedicated capital or brand name capital.  Investments that can be put to other use without costs are not 
asset specific. 
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The outsourcing decision is determined by the degree of asset specificity and its 
influence on production costs and transaction (or governance) costs.  Transaction costs 
are costs associated with the governance structure (internal production or market 
procurement) and depend on the way transactions are organized.  It is recognized that 
incentive problems and bureaucratic costs of internal governance are higher for 
internal organization.  This results in a comparative cost advantage for external 
procurement in conditions without asset specificity.  When asset specificity and 
uncertainty increase, contracting becomes more difficult.  This is because transactions 
that require specific investments normally also require difficult contracts to protect the 
contracting parties from opportunistic behavior.  The risk of using asymmetric 
information is higher in these uncertain environments.  Higher asset specificity and 
uncertainty make control over the supplier's actions more difficult and shift the 
balance in favor of internal production. 
On the other hand, when asset specificity and uncertainty are Iowa firm is better off 
buying the activity on the market because suppliers have a production cost advantage 
over buyers.  Outside suppliers can aggregate demand, which enables them to benefit 
from economies of scale, smoother production schedules, and centralization of 
expertise.  Production cost differences decrease with increases in asset specificity. 
Suppliers produce for less customers so that cost advantages decrease.  Differences approach zero in cases with very high asset specificity but never favor the buyer 
because of scale economies. 
The same framework applies in the special case of outsourcing decisions.  In a low 
uncertainty low asset specific situation de-integration or outsourcing is likely to be 
selected because transaction cost as well as production cost advantages are realized. 
Internal production has considerable transaction cost advantages when asset 
specificity and uncertainty are substantial.  Production cost differences are minimal 
because the supplier is unable to aggregate demand. 
From a transaction cost economics point of view the anticipation of specific 
investments in a relationship with a supplier and the uncertainty resulting from this 
investment are valid reasons to produce internally.  Internal production reduces 
transaction costs and eliminates production cost differences.  Outsourcing should be 
preferred in low asset specific situations with more certainty because total cost 
differences favor external procurement 
3. Sunk cost effect in outsourcing decisions 
Accounting norms and standard economic theory prescribe a forward looking 
perspective for outsourcing decisions.  The decision whether or not to outsource an 
activity should be based on a comparison of the available "make" and "buy" options 
on the basis of expected future cash flows.  Within this general prescriptive 
7 framework transaction cost economics emphasizes that not only production costs but 
also anticipated transaction costs should be taken into account.  Because these 
transaction costs are often difficult to specify and estimate, many authors in 
accounting warn against head-over-heels commitment to outsourcing. 
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On the other hand, the mere fact that the firm is currently "making" the activity for 
which outsourcing is contemplated should be irrelevant.  Outsourcing - or vertical de-
integration - decisions are normatively equivalent to vertical integration decisions. 
Any historical investments in a current "make" activity are to be treated as sunk costs. 
These costs were incurred in the past and are not changed by today's alternative 
actions. Decision makers should ignore these costs in the outsourcing decision and 
take only future and relevant cash flows into account. 
Research in psychology, however, demonstrates that individual decision makers are 
not immune to sunk cost biases (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).  Sensitivity to sunk costs 
often leads to perseverance or even escalation of normatively inappropriate courses of 
action.  These effects have been shown in tasks that are related to various business 
sub-disciplines (Bazerman, Beekun and Schoorman, 1982; Drummond, 1994; Garland 
and Newport, 1991; Staw, 1976, 1981; Staw and Ross, 1978).  In each case the mere 
existence of prior investment (in money or in time) interferes with the consideration 
and adoption of alternative courses of action, with which the decision maker would be 
normatively better off. We propose that most - if not all- outsourcing decisions are threatened by this bias. 
While outsourcing decisions should only take into account anticipated costs and 
revenues of the make and buy options,  current "make" activities have usually been 
the result of considerable prior investments.  If a parallel with sunk cost biases in 
other business activities exist,  we should observe more reluctance to choose for 
outsourcing than there would be for choosing the same "buy" option when no prior 
investment has taken place, even if relevant accounting information would prescribe 
the choice for outsourcing in either case. 
9 
Research into the sunk cost aspect of vertical integration decisions is rare, and to our 
knowledge there are no empirical studies investigating its role in outsourcing 
decisions.  In one study that is related to our concerns, Whyte (1994) found an impact 
of sunk costs in vertical integration decisions.  In his study decision makers assumed 
the role of the general manager of a manufacturing company, and had to evaluate the 
possibility of acquiring a distributor of the firm's products.  The key manipulation in 
his study was whether prior transaction specific investments had been made by the 
manufacturer into the relationship with the distributor.  Whyte (1994) found that such 
sunk costs considerably increase the likelihood that the manufacturer decides to 
integrate vertically even though normative analysis would favor the continuation of 
the current strategy.  In Whyte's study, sunk costs and transaction costs coincided. 
Our own research investigates exactly the opposite problem.  We study the impact of 
sunk cost on the decision to de-integrate.  With outsourcing transaction costs and sunk 
costs are dissociated: transaction costs are forward looking and should be taken into account; prior investments in internal production are backward looking and should 
not. 
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Past research into sunk cost biases in managerial decision making can be used to 
identify potential reasons for the reluctance to engage in outsourcing.  First, it has 
been recognized that in many cases the incorporation of sunk costs in a decision can 
be the result of information asymmetry within an organization where middle managers 
possess privately held information and have an incentive to shirk (Harrell and 
Harisson, 1994; Harisson and Harrell, 1993; Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut, 1989). 
Outsourcing decisions may be postponed for similar reasons: managers may have an 
incentive to withhold or distort information that would favor outsourcing, thereby 
threatening their own power base within the organization.  However, asymmetric 
information and opportunistic agents will lead to non-optimal decisions in many 
decision tasks.  Our goal in this study is to examine whether there is something 
intrinsic to the outsourcing decision which makes it especially vulnerable to the sunk 
cost bias. 
Prior research suggests a number of reasons for postponing outsourcing that are based 
on the individual psychology of the decision maker.  One common explanation is 
based on the fact that outsourcing constitutes a discontinuation of policy.  Managers 
who have been responsible for past "make" decisions may be reluctant to outsource, 
merely because it would create the appearance that they are trying to correct for a prior 
mistake.  They would be reluctant to create such an impression, either because they 
see it to as a threat to their perceived competence by the other members of the 11 
organization (Brockner, Rubin, and Lang, 1981; Fox and Staw, 1979), or even 
because it would constitute a threat to their self esteem.  Support for this latter 
hypothesis is found in studies finding a larger sunk cost bias when the decision maker 
believes he was responsible for the past investments (Bazerman, Guiliano and 
Appelman, 1984; Brockner, 1992; Chenhall and Morris, 1991; Staw, 1976).  Similar 
motivations may underlie the reluctance to outsource when a decision maker has been 
responsible for starting internal production in a previous period.  On the other hand, 
face-saving decisions will only "work" when the decision problem is not completely 
transparent.  This may explain why some studies found a reduction in the bias when 
decision makers expected to be held accountable for the outcomes of their decisions 
(Simonson and Nye, 1992). 
A different motivational explanation was provided by Arkes and Blumer (1985). 
Some of their empirical results could not be explained by the desire to appear 
consistent with prior decisions.  For example, participants in one of their studies 
massively preferred to eat a pizza for which they paid $5 rather than an identical pizza 
that had cost them only $3.  The authors formulated the hypothesis that many sunk 
cost biases may be explained by the mere desire not to be wasteful. 
4. Experimental studies 
In this paper we intend to test whether "make or buy" decisions are biased towards 
internal production when the buy option is presented as a choice for outsourcing.  We 12 
do this buy comparing relative preferences for make and buy options, keeping relevant 
accounting information constant while experimentally manipulating whether the 
current choice has been preceded by a prior decision in favor of internal production. 
We did however try to control for rational explanations for the sunk cost effect.  The 
decision maker in the experiment was the only "player".  Incentives to shirk or social 
justification were therefore excluded as an explanation.  Also, information about the 
decision alternatives was constructed such that the expected cost of the outsourcing 
option was always lower than that of internal production, which made outsourcing the 
rationally optimal choice under all circumstances (Northcraft and Wolfe, 1984). 
In all our studies the same basic scenario was used.  Participants were asked to assume 
the role of the general manager of a company manufacturing television sets.  The 
participant had to estimate the probability s/he would "make" or "buy" the cathode ray 
tubes used in the assembly of the sets.  The key manipulation was whether in house 
production of the tubes would be a continuation of an existing activity (sunk cost 
condition), or a new activity (make or buy condition).  The characteristics of the 
outsourcing option were varied experimentally to make it more or less attractive 
according to the predictions of transaction cost analysis.  Normative analysis of the 
two alternatives would make the outsourcing option superior in all conditions. 
Experiment 1 was designed to examine the joint effects of transaction costs and sunk 
costs.  In a follow-up to this experiment we also manipulated the amount of thought 
the participant was invited to invest in the decision, to examine whether the influence 
of sunk costs could be due merely to mindless decision making.  In Experiment 2, the l3 
make option was made more attractive by stating that the prior investment could be 
used for other purposes.  This should reduce the bias against outsourcing if the 
underlying motivation is based on a desire not to be wasteful, but not if it is based on a 
desire for consistency.  In addition, we examined whether the effect of sunk costs and 
especially transaction costs is related to the individual decision maker's risk attitude. 
Experiment 1 
Participants 
All 137 participants in the experiment provided usable responses.  Participants were 
senior undergraduate students taking an advanced seminar in financial analysis. They 
had completed a managerial accounting course and several economics courses, so they 
were familiar with normative decision analysis as taught in these courses.  The 
experiment was conducted at the beginning of a regular class session. 
Decision task and procedure 
Four experimental scenarios were written based on the orthogonal manipulation of 
two factors: the presence or absence of sunk costs, and the presence or absence of high 
transaction costs in the outsourcing option.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four scenarios. 
Scenario 1 was a base line condition in which neither sunk costs nor transaction costs 
are associated with the outsourcing option.  It projected the participant in the role of a 
general manager facing the decision between either making or buying the cathode ray 14 
tubes used in the assembly of television sets.  The net present value of future 
production costs would be BEF45000000.  An external supplier offers to sell the tubes 
for BEF32000000.  Buying from the supplier would require the company to buy a 
truck for BEF5000000, but the truck could be used for alternative purposes as well 
(e.g., it could easily be rented out).  In this scenario the outsourcing option is superior 
by all standards. 
In scenario 2, the situation was identical except that uncertainty and asset specificity 
were introduced.  With equal probabilities the costs could be either BEF 22000000, 
BEF 32000000, or BEF 42000000.  In addition the BEF 5000000 truck was an asset 
specific investment; it could not be used for other purposes.  Transaction cost analysis 
predicts more reluctance in this scenario to move to the outsourcing option, even 
though the normatively appropriate decision would still be to opt for outsourcing. 
Scenarios 3 and 4 were identical to scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, except that the 
participant was told that a few months before s/he had made an investment in the CRT 
production line, valued at BEF 15000000.  This represents a sunk cost and should not 
be incorporated in the decision to make or buy. 
Participants received one of these four scenarios and were asked to indicate their 
preference buy putting a mark on a continuous scale anchored with "definitely make" 
on one side and "definitely buy" on the other side.  The direction of the scale was 
counterbalanced to control for the potential influence of scale use tendencies. 




Scale direction had no effect at all.  Table 1 therefore only presents the mean 
attractiveness of outsourcing in each of the four remaining cells.  Participants on 
average opted for outsourcing.  The overall preference for outsourcing is not very 
informative as it may be due to the choice of scenarios and the specific cost data that 
were included.  Therefore only the differences between the conditions are 
meaningfully interpretable.  The four scenarios constitute a 2 (sunk cost) by 2 
(transaction costs) by 2 (scale direction) between subjects design.  Analysis of 
variance (ANOV  A) revealed main effects in the expected directions for the presence 
of sunk costs (F(1, 129)=3.87; p<O.06), and for the presence of transaction costs (F(1, 
129)=10.51; p<O.Ol).  The interaction was not statistically significant (F<l). 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
Results show that both the inferred transaction costs and sunk costs have an influence 
on the propensity for outsourcing.  Consideration of transaction costs is rational, and 
participants took them in account appropriately.  They were more reluctant to opt for 
outsourcing to the extent that asset specificity and expected price variability of the 
supplier were high.  The impact of transaction costs is also identical regardless of 
whether the decision is framed as an outsourcing decision or not.  Participants however also considered sunk costs, as preference for internal production was 
significantly higher when the "buy" option was framed as outsourcing, compared to 
when it was framed as a new decision. 
The results of Experiment 1 show that a sunk cost effect operates in outsourcing 
decisions even when opportunistic behavior and social esteem motivations were 
excluded by design.  They do not allow us to distinguish between other potential 
sources of the effect.  We considered the possibility that the reluctance to outsource 
may be due to the  motivation to be consistent and/or motivation not to waste 
resources.  If  the behavior is motivated by the desire not to be wasteful,  we should 
observe that decision makers are more likely to move to outsourcing if they get 
assurance that the prior investments will not be wasted.  If they are motivated by 
consistency, the bias should occur regardless of whether alternative destinations for 
the prior investments are available.  This hypothesis will be tested in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 1 also demonstrates a strong influence of transaction costs on the 
outsourcing decision.  High transaction costs imply that the outsourcing option is 
more risky, and participants took this risk into account.  However, reactions to risk are 
subject to individual differences in risk attitude.  Decision makers who are more risk 
averse are expected to be more sensitive to risk information than decision makers who 
are less risk averse.  In Experiment 2, we will test whether risk attitude predicts 
incorporation of transaction costs in the outsourcing decision. 17 
Before describing Experiment 2, we will address one common criticism on 
demonstrations of sunk cost effects. This criticism states that participants are not 
motivated to examine the available evidence carefully.  Superficial examination would 
then not allow the decision maker to realize that the sunk cost is effectively sunk, and 
therefore irrelevant to the decision.  Therefore we considered the potential effect of 
decision maker involvement as an empirical question and tested whether forcing 
participants to consider all information carefully could reduce the bias.  Experiment 
lA is a replication of Experiment 1, but the extent and type of thought subjects are 
forced to commit to the task is manipulated.  Participants were 78 senior 
undergraduate students participating for course credit in an advanced marketing class. 
All had taken classes in managerial accounting and economics.  Two cells of the 
design replicate scenarios 1 and 2 in Experiment 1.  Subjects are asked to choose 
between making or buying the cathode ray tubes they need to manufacture TV sets.  In 
scenario 1 this is a new decision; in scenario 2 there has been a prior investment of 
BEF15000000 in a production line for these components.  Immediately after reading 
the scenario, subjects indicate their preference for the make or the buy option as 
before.  The other cells in the design receive identical information, but the instructions 
preceding the decision are different.  In conditions 7 and 8, subjects are asked to write 
down the pros and cons of each option before making a decision in a blank space 
provide on the answering sheet.  In conditions 9 and 10, each potential element is 
listed on a sheet of paper, and participants have to check whether it is a relevant 
element in the decision or not, before indicating their preferences.  These 
manipulations correspond tot the "think hard" and "think smart" strategies that have 
been investigated in the decision making literature (Fishhof, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 18 
1980).  Mere effort ("think hard") would reduce a decision making bias if the bias is 
merely due to superficial thinking.  It would not help if subjects do not realize that the 
relevance of the information for the decision needs to be evaluated.  "Think Smart" 
instructions mimic the decision process of somebody who realizes that the information 
in the scenarios has to be investigated for relevance. 
To our own surprise we found no effect at all of the thought-inducing manipulations. 
The sunk cost effect was strong (F( 1, 77) =  5.41; p<0.03 ) regardless of whether the 
decision maker was invited to think hard, smart or not at all.  Apparently the 
instructions even increased the perceived relevance of the sunk cost for the decision. 
Average rated attractiveness scores  of the outsourcing option in each condition are 
presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
Participants in the study were 110 executive students taking a luasters level class in 
managerial accounting.  The experiment was conducted near the end of the semester 
when basic concepts of normative decision making were already covered.  In addition 
the students had already taken several economics classes.  There is no reason to 
believe that these participants should not be sensitive to the normative requirements of 
the task.  The experiment was conducted at the beginning of a regular class session. 19 
Decision task and procedure. 
In the second the same scenarios were used as in Study 1.  A first goal was to replicate 
the findings obtained in Experiment 1.  Two additional issues were investigated. 
First, we included a condition in which the prior investment in the cathode ray tube 
production line was reversible.  If  sunk cost effects on outsourcing decisions are only 
due to the motivation not to appear wasteful (Arkes and Blumer, 1985) the effect 
should disappear in this condition. If  the effect is due to a desire to remain consistent 
with prior policies, we may expect a continued impact.  Second, we added a measure 
of individual differences in risk taking tendency.  We wanted to examine whether 
susceptibility to a sunk cost effect and consideration of transaction costs are related to 
a general tendency to be risk averse or risk seeking. 
The four cells of the design of Study 1 were repeated here.  Two cells were added. 
They replicated scenarios 3 and 4 in study 1, with the exception that participants were 
told that the production line that was invested in could easily be used for other 
activities.  This manipulation removes the perceived wastefulness of outsourcing the 
activity.  The prior investments are not made useless by changing the policies.  If the 
participants in this condition would still be more reluctant to outsource, their 
underlying concern must be related to a desire for consistency rather than frugality. 
The main dependent measures were collected as in study 1, except that the 
unnecessary counterbalancing of the response scale was omitted.  The scale was 
anchored by "definitely make" on the left side and "definitely buy" on the right side. 20 
Immediately after indicating their propensity to outsource production, participants 
answered two questions designed to measure their risk taking tendency.  Following 
recommendations of Selto and Cooper (1990) they were presented with two scenarios 
similar to the ones used in the experiment 
Results. 
Subjects were divided in a risk averse and risk neutral group based on a median split 
in measured risk attitude.  Internal consistency of the two questions was low 
(Cronbach's alpha < 0.60).  We therefore conducted the analyses with both measures 
separately, as well as with a combined risk attitude score.  All analyses yielded the 
same results.  Below only the results based on the combined measure are reported. 
Risk attitude was included as a factor in a 3 (sunk cost: absent; present; present with 
alternative use) by 2 (transaction costs: present or absent) by 2 (high risk aversion vs. 
low risk aversion) between subjects analysis of variance. The results are presented in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
A-priori contrasts were run within an overall ANOVA on the 3 x 2 x 2 design to 
examine differences between the three sunk cost conditions.  The effect of sunk costs 
was replicated in this experiment.  However, the likelihood of outsourcing in the 
"prior investment not sunk" condition was in between those of the other two 
conditions, such that both the contrast with the "no sunk cost condition" (F( 1, 98) = 
5.06, p<O.03), as with the "sunk cost condition" (F(l, 98) = 14.64, p<O.OOl) was 
significant.  This pattern was obtained regardless of the presence or absence of transaction costs, and regardless of whether the participant was high or low in risk· 
aversion. 
The main effect of transaction costs was replicated as well.  In the absence of 
transaction costs, participants were more likely to outsource than when transaction 
costs could be inferred (F(1, 98) =  3.95, p<0.05).  However, we also found a 
marginally significant interaction between transaction costs and risk attitude 
(F(1, 98) = 2.26, p<O.13).  Follow-up simple effects tests revealed that the effect of 
transaction costs was only significant for the high risk averse participants 
(F(1, 50) = 5.51, p<0.03).  In the group with low risk aversion there was no 
transaction cost effect (F<1). 
Discussion. 
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Experiment 2 confirmed the results of Experiment 1.  Participants are sensitive to 
sunk costs in addition to transaction costs when making a decision on whether or not 
to outsource a production process.  The confirmation increases our confidence that the 
effect is reliable.  The information that the prior investment will not be lost reduced 
the tendency to avoid outsourcing, but not to the extent that the sunk cost effect would 
completely disappear.  This implies that to a considerable extent the decision not to 
outsource must be motivated by a desire to preserve continuity with prior decisions. 
This result is the more remarkable because the participants only had to assume that 
they made the prior investment decision.  In situations where they actually would· 
have to make a first decision the effect is likely to be even stronger. 22 
The desire for continuity is consistent, not only with a sunk cost bias, but also with a 
more general class of biases that have been labeled "status-quo bias" (Samuelson and 
Zeckhausen, 1988).  The status quo bias refers to a tendency to "maintain one's 
current or previous decision" even though alternative options might be more attractive 
from a normative point of view.  The status-quo effect is related to prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Prospect  theory is a descriptive theory of human 
decision making which predicts that value functions are steeper for losses than for 
gains.  As a result, people attach higher value to something that they have to give up 
than to the same thing when they would receive it. 
We would like to note that prospect theory has been called for as an explanation for 
the sunk cost effect, but in a different context.  Whyte (1986) focused on conditions in 
which decision makers face a choice between two losses, like when they have to 
choose between abandoning a project or continuing a project although it has a 
negative net present value.  In that case prospect theory predicts that decision makers 
will favor an uncertain loss over a certain loss, because the value function is convex 
for losses.  This explanation does not apply to outsourcing decisions, which are most 
easily framed as a choice between a loss and a gain. 
In any event, the finding that the irrational reluctance to outsource may be due to a 
more general bias towards status-quo in addition to a sunk cost bias is an important 
finding that needs to be further examined in follow-up research. In contrast to any normative model, participants in our experiments also considered 
sunk costs in the outsourcing decision, even when opportunistic behavior and social 
esteem motivations were excluded by design.  We confronted decision makers with 
outsourcing scenarios which were identical except for the mention of a past 
24 
investment in current internal production.  Participants randomly assigned to this sunk 
cost condition were significantly more reluctant to engage in outsourcing than 
participants who were told there were no prior investments.  The results are consistent 
with a wide body of descriptive research in business decision making, demonstrating 
that sunk costs do matter. 
Experiment 2 allowed us to elaborate further on the type of bias underlying the 
reluctance to outsource.  If the presence of a cost that is irreversibly sunk would be the 
sole determinant of this behavior, the bias should disappear if decision makers are told 
that the prior investments would not be lost.  This did not happen.  Although the bias 
was reduced, participants in this condition still were significantly more reluctant to 
outsource than participants in the control condition.  We argued that part of the bias 
observed in outsourcing decisions is therefore likely to be a "status quo" bias, 
according to which decision makers are motivated by the desire to act consistent with 
prior decisions, regardless of whether past decisions imply irreversible investments 
(Samuelson and Zeckhausen, 1988).  Again further research will be necessary 
examine the relative importance of different determinants of the bias. 
Finally, we need to acknowledge the limitations of our study.  First, the experiments 
were conducted with student subjects as participants.  Further research needs to 25 
evaluate whether the same biases will operate in decisions made by managers in the 
field.  Managers are more familiar with the specific decision area, and may therefore 
be better able to separate relevant and irrelevant costs.  While this remains an 
empirical question to be answered, we would like to note that students are probably 
more familiar with the principles of normative decision analysis.  It is not unlikely that 
managers would perform even worse.  More research is needed to examine 
generalisability across relevant populations of decision makers.  The same conclusion 
holds with respect to generalis  ability across decision problems.  For example, we 
carefully avoided decision scenarios in which the sunk costs would explicitly involve 
past investments in people.  Personnel decisions are much more complex and are 
determined by an interplay of efficiency considerations and norms with respect to 
ethical responsibility (Drummond, 1994). 
In summary, while accounting researchers recently have been arguing that companies 
are overly committed to outsourcing and underestimate potential drawbacks that are 
due to transaction costs (Chalos 1995), we provide a different perspective.  In 
situations where the optimal decision would be to discontinue internal production in 
favor of outsourcing individual decision makers display a striking conservatism.  First, 
they do take transaction costs into account, although the effect is only reliable for risk 
averse decision makers.  Decision makers are even more conservative than they 
should be, by incorporating sunk costs as well.  These results present a challenge to 
the prevailing wisdom in the accounting literature, and suggest an elaborate research 
agenda for many years to come. References 
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181. No sunk cost  Sunk cost 
No anticipated transaction costs  .54  .62 
Anticipated transaction costs  .68  .78 
Table 1:  Experiment 1: Average propensity to outsource as a function of prior investment and 
anticipated transaction costs due to asset specific investments and risk information. No sunk cost  Sunk cost 
No "think" instructions  .75  .62 
"Think hard" instructions  .67  .59 
"Think smart" instructions  .75  :62 
Table 2:  Experiment lA: Average propensity to outsource as a function of prior investment and type of 
instructions High risk aversion (n=54)  Low risk aversion (n=56) 
no transaction  transaction costs  no transaction  transaction costs 
costs  costs 
no sunk costs  .83  .72  .81  .78 
prior investment  .75  .65  .67  .66 
not sunk 
prior investment  .68  .49  .64  .63 
sunk 
Table 3:  Experiment 2: Average propensity to outsource as a function of prior investment and 
anticipated transaction 